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The use of drugs and alcohol by athletes generally, and by professional
football players in particular, has long captured the attention of the Ameri-
can public. And, as times have changed, so too has society's perception of
the professional football player. Whereas the off-field exploits of players in
the past were looked upon with bemusement, today's player engaging in
similar behavior can expect not only to be subjected to public scrutiny, but
also to be disciplined by the League.
Indeed, drug and alcohol abuse has been a source of contention between
the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA"), the Na-
tional Football League ("NFL") and the National Football League Man-
agement Council ("NFLMC"). As a result, a coherent, effective substance
abuse testing and treatment policy has yet to emerge.' For nearly a decade
before the NFLPA renounced its bargaining status, those parties were un-
able to agree on a policy which could effectively rehabilitate players with
substance abuse problems and, at the same time, retain sensitivity to play-
ers' privacy and other civil rights.'
The NFLMC is a consortium of the owners of NFL teams-much like a
trade association. It acted as the management bargaining agent in labor
contract negotiations. Along with the NFL, it has sought to implement as
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1. See In the Matter of Arbitration Among the National Football League Players Association
and the National Football League Management Council and the National Football League (Octo-
ber 25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.) [hereinafter Kasher, Arb.].
2. Id at 13-21.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
comprehensive a testing and treatment program as possible, including ran-
dom testing throughout the year, in pre-season, in the regular season, and in
the off-season.3 In support of its position, the NFL has, in the past, argued
that the Commissioner was empowered by the 1982 Collective Bargaining
Agreement to take any steps necessary to protect the game's integrity.4
The NFLPA used to be the bargaining agent for players. Its chief inter-
est is in protecting the rights of NFL players. In the past, it attempted to
curb the Commissioner's efforts to augment and expand his power in disre-
gard of the restrictions placed on him by past collective bargaining
agreements.-
The NFLMC has argued that the NFLPA's opposition to the NFL's
drug testing proposals violated both the terms agreed to in the 1982 Collec-
tive Bargaining Agreement and the negotiating history of the 1977 and
1982 Collective Bargaining Agreements, in which the NFLMC rejected the
NFLPA's attempts to circumscribe the Commissioner's "integrity of the
game" powers.6 The NFLPA, in turn, argued that it never agreed to what
the League later attempted to implement.
A new chapter in the substance abuse policy debate began to unfold on
November 6, 1989 when the NFLPA renounced its status as the players'
collective bargaining agent.7 The NFLPA took this extraordinary step in
order to combat the NFL's far-reaching restraints on player movement,
though it also has the potential for affecting players' rights with regard to
drug testing.
If not for the NFLPA's decision to renounce its status, substance abuse
testing in general, and the League's program/policy in particular, might
have remained at the status quo. However, avenues have now been opened
for altering the system on both sides of the dispute. Players are no longer
protected by the terms of the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement and its
narrow drug testing provisions. Thus, the NFL, theoretically, could make
good on its threat to impose random drug testing on players absent any
restrictions in a collective bargaining agreement. But while the players are
3. See Greig Neff & Robert Sullivan, The NFL and Drugs: Fumbling for a Game Plan,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 10, 1986, at 83; Ron Borges, NFLPA Opposes Spot-Testing for Drug
Use, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 1986, at 55; Gordon Forbes, Rozelle Ready to Fight Drug Problem
on His Own Terms, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 1986, at C5; Kasher, Arb., supra note 1, at 13-21.
4. See 1982 National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. VIII. This arti-
cle empowers the NFL's Commissioner to fine, discipline and/or suspend players for engaging in
any type of conduct which is detrimental to the integrity of, or public's confidence in, professional
football. That Agreement, however, is no longer in force (See infra. Sec. IV).
5. Kasher, Arb., supra note 1, at 21-27.
6. Id. at 34-42.
7. Manny Topel, No Union May Mean More Tests, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 1989, at 161.
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no longer protected by the collective bargaining agreement, they are no
longer constrained by it, either. Individual players may now challenge the
procedures and propriety of the current drug testing policy or any other
policy that the NFL might try to impose under a variety of legal theories
which may not have been available while the collective bargaining agree-
ment was in effect.
This article will examine the history of the labor-management conflict
over the substance abuse issue. It will also discuss the status of the current
policy. Further, the article will examine the objective propriety of the con-
tent and administration of the policy. But principally, it will examine the
factors that may ultimately require judicial resolution of the issue.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT REGARDING
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
The NFL made inroads into the realm of substance abuse testing in
1971 when Commissioner Rozelle issued the NFL's first loosely designed
drug policy.' That first policy purported to educate players about the dan-
gers of substance abuse.9 Examination of that policy reveals two elements
which have arisen, time and again, throughout the developmental history of
the substance abuse policy. First, the Commissioner issued the written pol-
icy just after the NFLPA was certified as the collective bargaining represen-
tative for NFL players, "but prior to any negotiated procedures regarding
drug testing, treatment and/or education .... ." The timing of the Com-
missioner's announcement foreshadowed the adverse relationship which
would develop between the NFL and the NFLPA over the implementation
of a substance abuse policy.11
Second, the provisions of that first policy were, by their very nature,
destined to be ineffective in remedying the NFL's substance abuse
problems. The posting of notices and education of players did not stem the
8. In the Matter of Arbitration Among the National Football League Players Association
and the National Football League Management Council and the National Football League (Oct.
25, 1986) (Kasher, Arb.).
9. Id The policy also required each NFL team to post notices in its training facility inform-
ing players that the "use of drugs not prescribed or approved by the team physician" violates NFL
rules. Id.
10. Id.
11. As will be discussed, there have been two chief disputes regarding the NFL's commitment
to a substance abuse policy. The first is that the NFL's commissioner has implemented and/or
augmented drug testing procedures in contravention of the collective bargaining process and of
existing collective bargaining agreements. The second dispute involves the provisions of the sub-
stance abuse policy, itself, its effectiveness, and its impact upon players' privacy and other civil
rights.
1991]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
flow of drugs into the NFL, as would become evident in the late 1970s and
the 1980s. Subsequently implemented policies, which will be discussed later
in the article, have proved equally ineffective.
Nevertheless, the NFL's substance abuse policy gradually developed
into a far-reaching program including testing, education and discipline
components. By 1973, the Commissioner had announced new elements of
the substance abuse policy, which, for the first time, included a discipline
provision.' 2 Overall, the 1973 additions changed the program from a
purely educational one to a program with practical tools to actually address
the drug problem. These tools included further education programs, disci-
plinary action and team reporting of prescription drug use, as well as the
appointment of a medical consultant. 3
The NFL's efforts to establish a coherent, effective substance abuse pol-
icy continued in 1975 with the hiring of Charles Jackson, a drug abuse ex-
pert, as a consultant. 4 The NFL retained Mr. Jackson to work with the
League's security department in further educating players, and to better
develop the security department's ability to investigate alleged substance
abuse incidents. 5 Following the NFL's hiring of Mr. Jackson, Commis-
sioner Rozelle reiterated the goals of the 1973 drug policy in a two-page
memorandum addressed to NFL players. This letter outlined virtually the
same points as those set forth in 1973.16 Again, however, the NFL's efforts
did not curb the NFL's growing drug problem.
In 1982, the NFL's drug problem was thrust into the public eye. Sports
Illustrated's cover story on June 14, 1982 was devoted to the NFL's drug
problem. 7 The story, written by Don Reese, a former player for the Miami
Dolphins and the New Orleans Saints, alleged a widespread substance
abuse problem in the NFL.' 8 The article served as a catalyst for wholesale
efforts toward eliminating the NFL's substance abuse problem. Soon after
the article was published, several prominent players, including Chuck
Muncie and Rick Upchurch, enrolled in drug dependency programs.' 9
12. Kasher, Arb., supra note 8, at 14.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 14-15.
16. Id. at 14.
17. Don Reese & John Underwood, Special Report: I'm Not Worth a Damn, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, June 14, 1982 at cover, 66-82.
18. Id. at 69.
19. Drugs in the NFL, USA TODAY, Jan. 29, 1986, at C3.
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At that time, Commissioner Rozelle told teams to begin testing for drug
use.20 Approximately one month later, on July 19, 1982, the NFLPA al-
leged that the NFLMC had violated federal labor laws and committed an
unfair labor practice by beginning a drug testing program without collec-
tively negotiating the testing procedures.21
While the NFLPA's unfair labor practice charge was pending, negotia-
tions were underway for a new collective bargaining agreement. Among
other things, the NFLPA sought increased compensation and the NFLMC
sought a drug testing policy.22 The issues were heatedly contested, and the
NFLPA ultimately called a players' strike following the third game of the
season.
23
On December 11, 1982, the NFLPA and the NFLMC agreed to a new
collective bargaining agreement, and the NFLPA withdrew its unfair labor
practice charge.24 The 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement ("1982
Agreement") included, for the first time, a collectively bargained substance
abuse policy.25 This policy included provisions for pre-season urinalysis
and blood testing, continuing drug dependency education efforts, reason-
able cause testing for those players with suspected substance abuse
problems, retention of the Hazeldon Foundation to administer the drug
program, and strict rules for confidentiality of drug testing results.2 6
The 1982 Agreement was a breakthrough in the development of a sub-
stance abuse policy because it established that teams were allowed to test
their players for substance abuse, as well as to treat any such problems and
to discipline drug abusers.27 The 1982 Agreement also included a provision
empowering the Commissioner to discipline players in the event their con-
duct threatened the integrity of the game.28 However, the agreement did
not stem the tide of NFL substance abuse. Just one year later, reports sur-
faced that several NFL players were addicted to cocaine and had been in-
volved in rehabilitation programs. 29 In addition, Coach Sam Rutigliano
20. Ethan Lock, The Legality Under the National Labor Relations Act of Attempts by Na-
tional Football League Owners to Unilaterally Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 2, 7 (1987).
21. National Labor Relations Board Office of General Counsel, Case No. 2-CA-18923, 1982
NLRB GCM LEXIS 23, Oct. 26, 1982.
22. Kasher, Arb., supra note 8, at 16.
23. Id.
24. Lock, supra note 20, at 9.
25. Kasher, Arb., supra note 8, at 16.
26. 1982 National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XXXI; Kasher,
Arb., supra note 8, at 16.
27. Kasher, Arb., supra note 8, at 16-17.
28. 1982 National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. VIII.
29. Drugs in the NFL, supra note 19, at C3.
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admitted that eight of his Cleveland Browns players were enrolled in the
team's drug rehabilitation program.30
Soon after the 1982 Agreement was signed, Commissioner Rozelle be-
gan to quickly discipline players. He suspended four players, Pete Johnson
and Ross Browner of the Cincinnati Bengals, E.J. Junior of the St. Louis
Cardinals and Craig Stemrick of the Houston Oilers, for four games with-
out pay during the 1983 season because of cocaine-related problems. 31
Early in the 1985 season, with no decrease in reports of drug use, Com-
missioner Rozelle indicated that the NFL favored mandatory drug testing
and would seek provisions for such testing in the next collective bargaining
agreement.32 Of course, the NFLPA and its members opposed any such
testing scheme.33 The NFLPA and the Commissioner clashed at the end of
the 1985 season when eight teams attempted to impose post-season drug
testing requirements upon their players as part of their post-season physical
examinations.34 After several players refused to take the tests and were
fined by their teams, the NFLPA filed an unfair labor practice charge, argu-
ing that the post-season drug tests were a unilateral change of working con-
ditions which violated the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").35 Of
course, the NFLPA also argued that the fines imposed upon players refus-
ing to take the tests, as was their right, were illegal. 36 The NFLMC coun-
tered, claiming the NFLPA's advice to players not to comply with the
preseason testing requirements violated Article I, section 3 of the 1982
Agreement, which mandates both the NFLPA and the NFLMC attempt, in
good faith, to ensure their respective charges, players and teams, comply
with the 1982 Agreement.37
The dispute surrounding the implementation of post-season drug tests
was highlighted when the Boston Globe reported that the New England
Patriots, one of the teams playing in the 1986 Super Bowl, had at least 12
players who used drugs during the season.38 Following these reports, team
30. Lock, supra note 20, at 9.
31. Drugs in the NFL, supra note 19, at C3.
32. Gordon Forbes, Rozelle: NFL May Push Drug Testing in Contract, USA TODAY, Oct. 16,
1985, at C7.
33. Ron Borges, NFLPA Opposes Spot Testing For Drug Use, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21,
1986, at 55.
34. Id.
35. Charge Against NFLMC, NLRB Case No. 2-CA-21403 (Dec. 18, 1985).
36. Id.
37. NFLMC v. NFLPA, Non-Injury Grievance Concerning Post-Season Physical Examina-
tions (Dec. 26, 1985).
38. Ron Borges, Drug Problem is Disclosed by Patriots: Dozen Involved, BOsTON GLOBE, Jan.
28, 1986 at 1, 67; Kasher Arb., supra note 8, at 17.
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members agreed to participate in a voluntary drug testing program. 9 The
NFLPA was up in arms over implementation of this new, more rigorous
program, and filed yet another unfair labor practice charge.' This time the
NFLPA charged that the Patriots' drug testing program surpassed the level
of testing authorized in the 1982 Agreement, and that the Patriots had also
violated the NLRA by dealing directly with employees, rather than the
union, in changing terms and conditions of employment.41
While the NFLPA protested the Patriots' drug testing plan, Commis-
sioner Rozelle resumed his efforts to implement a mandatory testing pro-
gram.42 In March 1986, at the NFL's meetings, the Commissioner stated
that he would implement a plan of his own if the NFLPA failed to agree to
adopt a firm substance abuse policy.43
The NFLPA's opposition to Rozelle's statement was twofold. First, the
NFLPA vowed to oppose a unilateral imposition of random drug testing
because of its invasive effects on players' privacy.' Second, the NFLPA
opposed Rozelle's position because of his apparent lack of authority under
the 1982 Agreement to impose such a program. 5 Nevertheless, Commis-
sioner Rozelle reiterated his intent to impose a league-wide drug testing
program. On July 7, 1986, Commissioner Rozelle acted on his statements,
announcing a substance abuse policy which would require two unscheduled
urinalyses during the regular season for every NFL player.46 In addition,
the policy included a discipline component under which, in a worst-case
scenario, a player could be banned permanently from the NFL.47 The
NFLPA sought an injunction, and the matters were referred to
arbitration.48
In June, 1986, the Patriots announced that they would not impose a
drug testing program on team members.49 As it turned out, both the post-
season drug testing case and the case involving Commissioner Rozelle's au-
39. Ron Borges, supra note 38, at 1, 57.
40. Charge Against the NFL Management Council and the New England Patriots, NLRB
Case No. 2-CA-21476 (Jan. 29, 1986).
41. Id.
42. Kasher, Arb., supra note 8, at 17; Forbes, supra note 32, at 35.
43. Id.
44. Gene Wojciechowski, Rozelle Says He's Ready to Impose Drug Testing Plan on NFL Play-
ers, L.A. TIMns, Mar. 11, 1986, at 111-1.
45. Id.
46. Kasher, Arb., supra note 8, at 19.
47. Id. at 19-20.
48. Id. at 20.
49. Lock, supra note 20, at 13.
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thority were submitted to arbitration and decided in favor of the NFLPA. 0
During the arbitration hearings to determine whether the NFL could im-
pose post-season drug tests, the NFLPA argued that the only tests author-
ized under the 1982 Agreement were the mandatory pre-season test and
those tests mandated by a reasonable cause determination.5" Further, the
NFLPA argued that management was specifically barred from imposing
post-season drug tests by article XXXI and the negotiations leading to the
adoption of that article.5 2
In response, the NFLMC argued that drug testing was not barred as a
component of the post-season physical examination under the terms of the
1982 Agreement, and that the management rights provision of the agree-
ment reserved all management rights not expressly limited in its terms.5 3
The arbitrator found in favor of the NFLPA, ruling that implementa-
tion of a post-season drug testing policy would violate the 1982 Agreement
because the parties, during collective bargaining concerning drug testing,
agreed only to pre-season and reasonable cause testing.54 Because the
NFLMC never sought permission to conduct post-season drug tests during
the negotiations which produced the drug testing agreement, the arbitrator
held that the NFLMC was barred by the 1982 Agreement from imposing
such tests. 5
In making these determinations, the arbitrator dismissed the NFLMC's
"management rights" argument because the terms of the 1982 Agreement
indeed limited management's right to impose drug testing programs.5" In-
deed, the "management rights" clause only applied to those items not dis-
cussed elsewhere in the Agreement.
A few days later, in a decision of equal significance, an arbitrator held
that Commissioner Rozelle could not implement a league-wide drug testing
program involving random drug tests for the same reasons which led the
arbitrator to reject the post-season drug testing plan. Reviewing the bar-
gaining history, the arbitrator noted that the NELPA had been opposed to
drug testing in any form.58 After collective bargaining, the NFLPA agreed
50. Opinion and Decision In re Arbitration between NFLMC and NFLPA Re: Post-Season
Physical Examinations (Oct.20, 1985) (Kagel, Arb.) [hereinafter Kagel, Arb.].
51. Id. at 11.
52. Id. at 11-13.
53. Id. at 10-11, 13; 1982 National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. I.,
sec. 4.
54. Kagel, Arb., supra note 50, at 32.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 33.
57. Kasher, Arb., supra note 8, at 72.
58. Id. at 70.
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only to pre-season and reasonable cause testing, and specifically provided
that no random drug testing would occur.5 9 The arbitrator rejected the
NFLMC's argument that the Rozelle proposal would not violate the ban on
spot-checking because under Rozelle's plan, all players would be randomly
drug tested.6°
The arbitrator found that random drug tests were never addressed in the
negotiations which led to the 1982 Agreement, and Article XXXI pre-
cluded all random drug testing.6 However, the arbitrator did order that
Commissioner Rozelle could, under the auspices of Article VIII, augment
the provisions of any pre-existing drug program provided the augmentation
did not specifically contradict any of the terms of the 1982 Agreement.62
The arbitrator found that where Commissioner Rozelle retained "integrity
of the game" authority, he could exercise that authority as long as he did
not violate the terms of the 1982 Agreement. 61 Since certain terms of Ro-
zelle's augmented drug program had not been addressed in the 1982 Agree-
ment, the arbitrator allowed imposition of those terms pursuant to a drug
policy augmentation." For example, the 1982 Agreement did not define
"prohibited substances," the status of players who were hospitalized for
drug treatment, a player's entitlement to pay for time spent in the hospital
for drug treatment, and the extent of discipline imposed upon players for
improper drug involvement. 6 All of these were areas the Commissioner
was free to address by implementing an augmented program.
III. DEVELOPMENT, STATUS AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE CURRENT
NFL SUBSTANCE ABUSE POLICY
Despite the NFL's arbitration losses, the League was still interested in
maintaining a more comprehensive drug policy than what was provided for
in the 1982 Agreement. Commissioner Rozelle introduced such a policy to
the NFL in 1987, and it has been updated annually. In the last few years,
the competence and fairness of League testing procedures has been so heav-
ily criticized by the NFLPA and the media that the credibility of the policy
has been seriously compromised. This section will discuss the apparent phi-
losophy behind the policy, what it entails, and how it has been imple-
mented. It will also discuss prospects for the policy's future. Ultimately,
59. Id. at 70-71.
60. Id. at 71-72.
61. Id. at p. 72.
62. Id. at 72-76.
63. Id. at 68.
64. Id. at 67-68.
65. Id. at 67.
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the single most important theme of the policy is control-evidenced by the
fact that, from its inception, the League alone has dictated and adminis-
tered its terms.
A. NFL Philosophy Toward Drug Abuse
The NFL has a number of legitimate reasons for maintaining a tough
stance toward drugs. Commissioner Rozelle has noted the acute health
risks for players who abuse drugs. 6 In addition, the NFL is arguably no
different than any other large employer. While substance abuse policies and
drug testing are not yet universally conducted by all employers, they are a
central operating feature of many Fortune 500 companies.' Certainly
NFL teams, as employers, have an interest in maximizing productivity
which might be compromised by employees who are intoxicated."" The
league also has an interest in protecting the safety of all players. Players
abusing certain substances might constitute a danger to themselves and to
other players, considering the inherently physical nature of professional
football and the high susceptibility to injury under even the most favorable
conditions.
Nevertheless, some questions arise which require closer scrutiny. First,
is drug use in the NFL so wide-spread as to warrant testing and strong
disciplinary measures? According to one source, 6.5% of NFL players
tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, alcohol and other drugs (excluding
steroids) in 1986 preseason testing. That number rose to 9.6% in 1987.
However, most of those positive test results were from prescription medica-
tion or alcohol. In 1986 only 0.7% of players tested positive for cocaine
and only 1.8% for marijuana. In 1987, only 0.8% tested positive for co-
caine and 1.6% for marijuana. 9 One commentator suggests that the NFL
has carefully concealed these statistics, because "to justify its brass knuckles
drug policy, the NFL needs to give the impression drug use by players is
66. See Drug Policy of the National Football League, Commissioner Rozelle's Introductory
Message, July 1989.
67. See Drug Abuse: The Workplace Issues, AMA Research Study 68 (1982) [hereinafter
Workplace Issues].
68. The owner of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Hugh Culverhouse, has publicly stated that he
believes drug use among players in the 1980s contributed to the decline of the franchise. Among
Buccaneer players, linebacker David Lewis was placed in a rehabilitation center in 1981, offensive
guard Greg Roberts was arrested in 1987 on drug possession charges, and linebacker Cecil John-
son pleaded guilty in 1988 to charges of cocaine trafficking. "It was Partytime USA,"
Culverhouse explained. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, AM Cycle, Aug. 5, 1989.
69. See Richard Demak & Jerry Kirshembaum, The NFL Fails its Drug Test, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, July 10, 1989, at 39.
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wide-spread."7 In any event, because players are high profile public
figures, substance abuse among their ranks captures a disproportionate
share of media attention, perhaps obscuring the actual extent of the
problem.
Second, why have players and the NFL been unable to reach a mutually
acceptable substance abuse policy? Other major professional sports leagues
have developed such policies through joint labor-management efforts.71
The National Basketball Association ("NBA") policy, for example, has
been held up as perhaps the model for the sports industry.72 That policy is
administered solely by an outside agency which is accountable to neither
the players association nor the league. Both labor and management negoti-
ated the substance as well as the administration of the policy, including
procedural safeguards and appeal mechanisms. 73 The NBA Players Associ-
ation agreed to a program which imposes some of the strictest discipline for
violations of its provisions. In turn, the League agreed to forgo any testing
other than on a "reasonable cause" basis.74 Presumably, the drug problem
in the NFL is not any greater or more inherently capable of solution only
by management. And the NBA has battled at least as much as the NFL
with high profile drug abuse.75
Third, do players themselves really object to attempts to create a drug
free work place? In fact, the goals of both players and the League appear to
be similar. NFLPA Executive Director Gene Upshaw has stated that if
afforded a role in developing a drug policy, "my players would have a pol-
icy that I guarantee would be far tougher than the league's would ever be.
[Other players] want [drug users] out of the game."' 76 Surprisingly, in a
Sports Illustrated poll of six hundred players, 59% stated they were in favor
of random drug testing.77 By all indications, most players do not fear test-




71. For a summary on the drug testing programs in the National Basketball Association,
Major League Baseball and NASCAR, See Laurence M. Rose & Timothy H. Girard, Drug Test-
ing in Professional and College Sports, 36 KAN. L. REv. 787, 797-802.
72. See Bob Ryan, NFL Should Adopt the NBA's Drug Testing Policies, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
26, 1990, at 28.
73. See Drug Agreement Between NBAPA and NBA, Oct. 1983, at 5-7.
74. See Judicial Conference on Sports, 2d. Circuit, 125 F.R.D. 197, 314-15 (1990).
75. The banning of Michael Ray Richardsen and John Lucas and especially the cocaine over-
dose of Len Bias are examples.
76. Ryan, supra note 72, at 28.
77. See Manny Topel, No Union May Mean More Tests, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 1989, at 161.
78. Players do, however, concede that steroid use is highly prevalent. Atlanta Falcons offen-
sive lineman, Bill Fralic, a former steroid user and a member of the NFLPA steroid committee
1991]
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The answers to these questions may in fact beg the ultimate question-
what is unique about sports which requires drug testing? Indeed, no other
entertainment medium routinely tests its performers. Perhaps the answer
lies in the NFL's belief that drug use among players projects a negative
image to fans who might, as a result, stop consuming their product.79 In-
deed, it is difficult to argue with such logic. Fans might certainly become
disenchanted with the idea of highly compensated athletes indulging in ille-
gal activities which, for average employees, might be a cause for discharge.
Still, players also have a financial stake in maintaining the image of the
product. In not sharing control, the NFL seems to have allowed the policy
itself to become the focus rather than any drug problem.
B. Elements of the Policy
One observer has described the paradigm drug policy as "a four legged
stool," consisting of first, deterrence; second, medical screening; third, edu-
cation and referrals; and fourth, treatment.8 0 While the NFL's policy con-
tains all of these elements, critics have argued that, in practice, the policy
consists of little more than testing.8
1. Rules of Conduct82
Players are forbidden from using, possessing or selling illegal drugs or
anabolic steroids, and are counseled to avoid abusing alcoholic beverages
and prescription drugs.83 This prohibition applies to players both during
the season and in the off-season.84 Perhaps most significantly, players are
told that substance abuse constitutes "conduct detrimental to the integrity"
of football and alienates fans.8" In addition, they are referred to a provision
of the NFL Standard Player Contract which requires players to avoid en-
suggested to Congress that up to 75% of players on offensive and defensive lines use steroids.
Fralic, in fact, has supported year-round random steroid testing in opposition to the NFLPA's
position on the subject. Id.
79. See 1990 National Football League Substance Abuse Policies, Part II, July 1990.
80. Workplace Issues, supra note 67, at 20.
81. See Demak & Kirshembaum, supra note 69, at 38.
82. The following elements of the policy have remained essentially unchanged since its
inception in 1987. For convenience sake, various sections from specific policies will be cited,
though they each contain an analog in other policies.
83. See Drug Policy of the National Football League, July 1989, at 1-2.
84. This off-season application was implied prior to 1990, at which time it was made official.
See 1990 National Football League Substance Abuse Policies, supra note 79, at 1.
85. See National Football League Policy and Procedures Re: Drug Abuse and Alcohol, July
1991, at 1 [hereinafter 1991 Substance Abuse Policies].
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gaging in conduct detrimental to the club or League and told a violation of
the policy violates the contract.8 6
2. Drug Testing
Draft choices are tested at scouting combines.8 Current players are
tested as part of their preseason physicals and on a reasonable cause basis."8
Reasonable cause includes any player who: (a) has previously tested posi-
tive, (b) has previously received treatment for drug or alcohol problems, (c)
has been convicted of a drug-related or alcohol-related offense (e.g., drunk
driving), or (d) in the reasonable medical judgment of the league advisor or
team physician, exhibits physical, behavioral or psychological symptoms of
substance abuse.89
The advisor and the team physician must agree on reasonable cause test-
ing and determine a schedule for frequency of tests, which may be sched-
uled or unscheduled and can be conducted even in the off-season.90 The
definition of reasonable cause may be a bit broad given the fact that most
employers only employ it on the fourth basis (i.e., observation).91 Failure to
submit to testing is considered the equivalent of a positive test.92 Further,
players who would deliberately attempt to adulterate a specimen are ad-
vised they will be subject to discipline, perhaps more severe than for a posi-
tive test result.93 The NFL fears that players will "doctor" urine samples. 94
3. Discipline
The NFL employs a three-step, progressive discipline policy. Under
step one, any player who tests positive for the first time is not subject to
discipline, but rather is required to undergo substance abuse evaluation by a
86. Id. See also, NFL Standard Player Contract, art. 1, § 3. But it is important to note the
extent to which the policy actually dovetails with the contract. In practice, each team is given a
fair amount of discretion as to how it wishes to apply the policy as a private employer and in-
dependant member of the NFL. Thus, what might be "detrimental conduct" to one team might
not bb to another. Moreover, some teams place a greater emphasis on rehabilitation and less on
testing.
87. See Drug Policy of the National Football League, July 1989, at 4.
88. Ia
89. Ia
90. Id. at 5.
91. See generally Jeffrey J. Olson, Legal and Practical Considerations in Developing a Sub-
stance Abuse Programs, 6 THE LABOR LAWYER 859 (1990).
92. See Drug Policy of the National Football League, July 1989, at 5.
93. Id.
94. For example, New York Giants linebacker Lawrence Taylor who tested positive twice for
cocaine, admitted in his biography LIVING ON THE EDGE that he often smuggled "clean" urine
from players who did not use drugs into the testing booths and passed it off as his own.
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team physician.95 The player is then to be offered medical treatment in-
cluding counseling, physiological outpatient or inpatient treatment, and an
after-care program.96 At step two, after a player tests positive for a second
time, he is to be suspended. Up until 1991, the player at step two was
suspended for four games; whereas now he is suspended for six games.97 A
third positive test results in step three, at which a player is permanently
banned from the NFL.98 Players may also be disciplined for committing
illegal acts relating to the possession or distribution of prohibited
substances.99
4. Testing Procedures
Certain administrative controls on the policy purport to protect the in-
tegrity of the testing processes. The testing program is administered by an
NFL-appointed drug advisor who is available for consultation with players
and team physicians and for clinical monitoring."°° The testing procedures
include designated sites for collection and bottles with tamper resistant
seals.1 All bottles are identified by a control identification number, rather
than the player's name. The player is required to sign a chain of custody
form. The collected urine is tested for presence of cocaine, marijuana, am-
phetamines, opium and morphine. Testing is performed at a National Insti-
tute of Drug Advocacy ("NIDA") certified laboratory.102 Players are
required to furnish the specimen under direct observation.10 3 After receiv-
ing an initial positive test, a confirmation test is performed and the advisor
notifies the team physician and league office of the result."° Finally, the
policy calls for all test results to be kept confidential by the advisor and the
League. 105
C. Administrative Problems
The NFL drug testing policy gained some unwanted publicity in the late
1980s, largely because of its administration. Most of the criticism came
from two sources. First, in mid-1989, Sports Illustrated published an arti-
95. See Drug Policy of the National Football League, July 1989, at 5.
96. Id.
97. See 1991 Substance Abuse Policies, supra note 85, at 6.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id. at 3.
101. Id. at. 4.
102. Id. at 4-5.
103. Id. at 4.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id. at 9-10.
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cle detailing improprieties in the testing program and suggesting that the
league's true motivation for firmness was an attempt to make the players
look bad in order to gain bargaining leverage with the NFLPA. 106 Second,
a news reporter at WJLA in Washington aired a three-part expose on the
program on the eve of the 1990 Super Bowl, alleging, in addition to sloppy
administration, outright coverups and discrimination. 107
At the center of the controversy was the NFL's drug testing advisor,
Dr. Forest Tenant. Dr. Tenant's credentials were impressive. He holds a
medical degree from the University of Kansas and a doctorate from the
UCLA school of public health. 108 He also supervised a methadone clinic in
Los Angeles. 10 9 However, questions about Dr. Tenant's philosophy and his
capacity for administration became the focus of his tenure.
Perhaps most disturbing was Dr. Tenant's belief that as far as "addicted
users are concerned you can forget about counseling." 110 Comments like
this immediately called into question the NFL's commitment to rehabilita-
tion. Instead, like the NFL, Dr. Tenant's efforts were directed toward test-
ing. He developed and marketed a rapid eye movement home kit to help
parents determine whether their children use drugs.111 He also distributed
instructional video tapes on how to detect drug users by observation (e.g.
clothing and hair style).1 12
Another target was the League's handling of urine samples which may
have been improper. Samples were allegedly mishandled, mislabeled, and
at times even spilled into each other.113 Further, unqualified individuals
were apparently drafted as lab technicians.114 Though Dr. Tenant may
have known of these problems with chain of custody, he routinely reported
test results to Commissioner Rozelle without mentioning the
improprieties.1 15
The Baskin Report also alleged that Tenant's program had protected
white players while incriminating blacks. It stated that certain white
quarterbacks had tested positive for cocaine but the players were never dis-
106. See Demak & Kirshembaum, supra note 69, at 38.
107. Baskin Report on NFL Drug Testing (WJLA, Jan. 22-24, 1990) [hereinafter Baskin
Report].
108. Id. at 9.
109. Elliot Almond, Controversy Continues to Dog Tenant, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1990.
110. Ryan, supra note 72.
111. Almond, supra note 109.





MAR QUEYTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
ciplined according to the three-step policy. 116 While the NFL categorically
denied the charges, the report was still damaging. Commissioner Tagliabue
called it a "journalistic molotov cocktail."1 " 7
These allegations appear to be borne out by at least two individual cases.
Denver Broncos tight end Clarence Kay allegedly tested positive for co-
caine for a third time in 1988.118 However, the urine sample in question
apparently sat for twelve days before it was analyzed. 119 In addition, some
normal chain of custody procedures were not observed.120 Reportedly,
Commissioner Rozelle agreed to refrain from banning Kay in exchange for
Kay's remaining quiet about the improprieties in the test. 21 Rozelle sent
him a letter stating "only my dissatisfaction with the administrative han-
dling of certain matters relating to your recent positive testing has led me to
refrain from removing you, based on that testing, for a minimum of 30 days
from the Broncos roster-a consequence normally called for in step 2 under
league policy at this time of year." '22 Rozelle then admonished Kay to
remain "clean" since he had been given his last chance. 12
3
Seattle Seahawks defensive back Terry Taylor failed a 1987 preseason
drug test and after rehabilitation was tested up to 25 times for reasonable
cause.124 In 1988 Commissioner Rozelle suspended Taylor for 30 days,
stating that he had tested positive for cocaine. 125 Taylor appealed the sus-
pension in United States District Court in Seattle, seeking a temporary re-
straining order. The court granted the order, stating "I do say that there
are serious questions raised about the manner of the testing, whether or not
its flawed. The question raised in my mind because he passed 24 out of 25
[drug tests], roughly, and there is a definite conflict and whether or not it
was his sample that he signed .... ."26 The court granted the temporary
injunction pending arbitration.
116. Id.
117. Leonard Shapiro, In Week of Hype and Glitz The Real Story is Miles Away, WASH.
PosT, Jan. 22, 1991.






124. Demak & Kirshenbaum, supra note 69, at 38.
125. Id.




In 1990, Commissioner Tagliabue changed the name of the Policy to
"Substance Abuse Policies" in a more than symbolic move. He dismissed
Dr. Tenant, replacing him with Dr. Lloyd S. Brown.12 7 In addition, he
created a separate set of rules for steroid abuse.128 In fact, he stated "I
regard [steroids] as the most severe drug problem we have in the National
Football League." '129 Further, executive and front office personnel are also
now required to undergo testing in accord with the policy. 3' In addition,
the 1991 policy provides for a "safe harbor," wherein a player can turn
himself in for drug use and seek rehabilitation without discipline.131 Such
players are placed on a reserve/nonfootball illness list under which they
continue to draw their full salaries.1 32
But the policy has also become more stringent in several respects. Play-
ers are now forbidden from consuming alcoholic beverages in locker rooms
or on team flights.1 33 Perhaps as a result of well-publicized drunk driving
arrests, players are now disciplined for any alcohol-related conviction. 134
A first offender is suspended for a minimum of four games; and, if aggravat-
ing circumstances exist (including serious injury or death of third parties) a
longer suspension may be imposed. 131 Second or subsequent alcohol-re-
lated offenses carry a six game suspension.13 6 Further, players merely con-
suming an excessive amount of alcohol may be required to undergo medical
counselling with a team physician and establish a procedure for clinical
monitoring including appropriate treatment and testing for cause. 137
While many of Commissioner Tagliabue's changes have been directed
toward improving administrative procedures, the League did not meet all of
the NFLPA's requests. For example, the NFLPA had asked that unit sam-
ples be split with the union retaining half the sample to confirm or deny the
test results. 13  The league refused and the NFLPA has been relegated to
127. 1991 Substance Abuse Policies, supra note 85, at 2.
128. 1990 National Football League Substance Abuse Policies, Part I, July 1990.
129. Tagliabue is Quick to Tackle Some Tough Questions, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1990.
130. 1991 Substance Abuse Policies, supra note 85, at 1.
131. Id at 6-7.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Id at 10.
134. Reggie Rogers, a former Detroit Lion defensive end, was convicted of manslaughter in
1987 when he was involved in an accident and was legally intoxicated. Detroit News (Sept. 3,
1987).
135. 1991 Substance Abuse Policies, supra note 85, at 8-9.
136. Id at 9.
137. Id. at 8.
138. David Ginsburg, ASSOCIATED PRESS, PM Cycle, Aug. 3, 1989.
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conducting its own testing in addition to that of the League. The NFLPA
has set up a portable facility outside of team headquarters and players on a
voluntary basis may store urine samples. 139
It is clear that players are still not satisfied with their degree of involve-
ment in formulating drug testing policy. And, Commissioner Tagliabue has
made no secret of the fact that he still favors random testing. NFLPA Ex-
ecutive Director Gene Upshaw summed up the Association's relationship
with the League stating, "[W]e don't trust anything they do-the tech-
niques, the procedure, the standard, their labs."' " Thus, at best, the cur-
rent status seems to be an uneasy detente which may not last, due in large
part to the fact that the players no longer have a bargaining agent.
IV. LEAGUE OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPANSION OF
SUBSTANCE ABUSE PROGRAM
At a recent judicial conference on sports issues, former Major League
Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn noted "a private employer, who is not
restricted by a state statute and is not restricted by a collective bargaining
agreement, or by the implications of the labor law, is pretty well free to do
what he wants in the area of drug testing." 4 ' Kuhn then acknowledged "in
professional sports that thing is settled pretty much in a mold. We do have
unions in professional sports; we do have collective bargaining; we do have
agreements ... ",42 The NFLPA's recent renunciation of bargaining sta-
tus has shattered that mold and, for the first time in recent memory, opened
the way for a league to exercise discretion in regard to substance abuse
testing-up to and including the random testing so coveted by Commis-
sioner Rozelle. Collectively, players are virtually powerless to stop a new
regime of testing, let alone to change the existing system. Unfortunately for
players, they cannot substitute the safety net of traditional labor law with a
lawsuit based on constitutional violations. Thus, no mechaninism exists
which would force the NFL to justify the reasonableness of its procedures
on a global basis.
A. Immediate Effect of Renounced Bargaining Status
For the greater part of the century, the labor movement had passed
professional athletes by and left them at the whim of management. Until
139. Elliot Almond & Randy Harvey, Union Offers Plan To Check Drug-Testing, L.A.
TIMES, July 14, 1989.
140. Ginsburg, supra note 138.




the 1960's, no real unions existed in professional sports. 143 The NFLPA
itself was not an acknowledged representative until the 1970's. 144 The
NFL's 1982 Agreement expired in 1987. After no progress was made on a
new agreement, the NFLPA finally voted on November 6, 1989 to renounce
itself as the bargaining representative for players. While the NLRB did not
immediately approve the action, the NFLPA immediately ceased bargain-
ing with the NFLMC.145 In a highly calculated gamble, the NFLPA seem-
ingly turned the clock backwards.
The NFLPA (probably correctly) surmised that it would be unable to
effectively challenge issues such as free agency while constrained by federal
labor laws. 146 The NFLPA probably also knew that even without a collec-
tive bargaining agreement the League might not impose restrictions any
more onerous than before, since it could not run the risk of providing addi-
tional ammunition for pending anti-trust suits.' 47 However, following the
NFLPA's renounciation, players no longer have protections in the area of
work rules and discipline-areas that without an agreement (and subject to
some qualification) courts generally leave to the discretion of employers. 148
1. No continuing duty to follow the bargaining agreement
Most significantly, players lost the precedential value of the Kagel and
Kasher arbitration decisions. Perhaps because comprehensive drug pro-
grams were not the norm in 1982, the 1982 Agreement addressed only pre-
employment and reasonable cause testing. But the agreement included an
integration clause which stated "[T]his agreement represents the complete
understanding of the parties on all subjects covered herein and there will be
143. Uberstine PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS, at 4-3 (1990).
144. Id. at 4-4. The NFLPA did exist in name, however, prior to that date. It was men-
tioned during Congressional hearings as early as 1958. See Organized Professional Team Sports:
Hearings on H.R. 5307, before House Subcommittee on Antitrust of the Commissioner on the Judi-
ciary, 85th Congress, 1st Session (1957-58).
145. See Associated Press, AM Cycle, Sept. 30, 1991. The NFLPA's action was taken five
days after the Court of Appeal for the Eighth Circuit ruled that an antitrust and labor exemption
applied so long as the NFLPA was a union.
146. See Ed Garvey, Forward to the Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports: A
Perspective on Collective Barginning in the NFL, 1989 DUKE L.J. 328, 337. Garvey argues that:
[c]ollective bargaining is being strangled to death because the NFL monster got too big and
too strong. They control the networks; they control the announcers, they have most of the
sports press on their side; and more important than anything, because they operate as a
monopoly sharing everything, they have money and time on their side. Id.
147. Id. See also Ethan Locke, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DUKE L.J. 339; Robert McCormick, Labor Relations in Professional Sports - Lessons in Collective
Bargaining, 14 EMPL. REL. L.J. 501 (1989).
148. Id.
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no change in the terms and conditions of this agreement without mutual
consent." 149 The arbitrator's holdings effectively limited testing to those
enumerated areas until a new agreement could be reached. But without an
agreement, the old restrictions and decisions are irrelevant.
The players also generally lost the benefit of individual noninjury griev-
ances-i.e., arbitration. In practice, players did not go to arbitration when
receiving drug supervision. In the past, when the NFL violated any provi-
sion of the agreement, an arbitrator was given the authority to "enter an
appropriate order, including to cease and desist from implementing or con-
tinuing the practice or proposal in question .... , 1 0 Arbitration is gener-
ally a simpler, more expedient and less expensive remedy than traditional
civil litigation.151
Moreover, had the NFL actually attempted to introduce an especially
intrusive component of a new substance abuse policy, the NFLPA might
have succeeded in having it enjoined pending arbitration. In Graphic Com-
munications Union v. Stone Container,52 the court that held an irreparable
harm might be effected on employees notwithstanding an arbitrator's ability
to prohibit future testing. The court reasoned that arbitration "could not
undo the humiliation and disclosure of personal information which will al-
ready have occurred from those tests while awaiting the arbitrator's deci-
sion." ' Still, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently refused
to enjoin unilateral testing, citing the very narrow exception to the Norris
La Guardia Act's proscription against injunctive relief when a bargaining
agreement exists.1 54
2. No duty to bargain
The NFL also may now disregard with impunity what it has been avoid-
ing for years-bargaining over the terms of the policy. Section 8(d) of the
149. 1982 National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, at 7.
150. Id. In fact, federal courts generally do not decide issues touched on in collective bar-
gaining. However, they do have jurisdiction in order to protect the integrity of an arbitrator's
decision. Thus, in Taylor v. National Football League, Case No. C88-11820 (W.D. Wash. 1988),
Judge Dimmick ordered a temporary restraining order preventing the suspension of Terry Taylor
only until an arbitrator could ultimately decide the case. Id.
151. See generally Bernard Cushman, Arbitration and the Duty to Bargain 1967, 67 Wis. L.
REV. 612 (1967).
152. 3 I.E.R. Cases 261 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
153. Id. at 262.
154. See Niagara Hooker Employees Union v. Occidental Chemical Corp., Daily Lab. R. 133
(July 11, 1991) (backpay and reimbursement remedies exist even if arbitration does not prevent
the temporary effect of discharge). For a discussion of the general prohibition on injunctions in
this area See Charles J. Morris, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 888-908 (1983).
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National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") makes the duty to bargain with
the union mandatory in certain circumstances. These include issues of
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment 
.. . ."1"
Moreover, employers are required to bargain in good faith and to im-
passe.15 6 Employers who disregard this duty and unilaterally impose
mandatory terms risk violating the NLRA. But, if a term is non-
mandatory, an employer can impose it on employees regardless of whether
it was not addressed in collective bargaining. 5 '
Commentators have argued that Commissioner Rozelle's attempts to
approve post-season testing and to impose random testing constitute viola-
tions of traditional labor law.'18 Still, the arbitrators in the two major NFL
decisions skirted this issue, expressly declining to decide whether drug test-
ing was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
But in two 1989 decisions, Johnson-Bateman 15 9 and Minneapolis Star
Tribune,"6° the NLRB finally pronounced that employers are required to
bargain fully over testing. Significantly, the NLRB also determined that a
union does not waive its right to approve the details of testing merely be-
cause it approves a broad "management rights" provision.' 6 ' The NFLPA
agreed that "the NFL clubs maintain and reserve the right to manage and
direct their operations in any manner whatsoever, except as specifically lim-
ited by the provisions of the agreement."' 62 Further, the board determined
that the right to bargain is not waived merely because an agreement is silent
on drug testing or an aspect thereof. 6 Rights are only waived if the union
specifically relinquishes an issue.
If the NFLPA again became the bargaining agent, the League would
have no legal basis for ever unilaterally imposing random drug testing with-
out at least bargaining to impasse. And, even if the League were to aban-
don attempts to randomly test, it would likely be unable to convince the
NFLPA to adopt even the same drug testing provisions as existed in the
1982 Agreement in connection with its current substance abuse policy. For
instance, the Agreement allows for "reasonable cause" testing but does not
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1981).
156. Id.
157. Charles J. Morris, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 772-84 (1983).
158. See generally, Locke, The Legality Under the National Labor Relations Act of Attempts
by National Football League Owners to Unilaterally Implement Drug Testing Programs, 39 U.
FLA. L. REv. 1 (1987).
159. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. 26 (1989).
160. Minneapolis Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 63 (1989).
161. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. 63 (1989).
162. 1982 National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. I, § 4 (1982).
163. Johnson-Bateman, 295 N.L.R.B. 25 (1989).
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define reasonable cause. The substance abuse policy, on the other hand,
finds reasonable cause to test even when a player does not exhibit signs of
substance abuse. Thus, any player who ever tested positive in the past can
be tested essentially at the whim of the NFL or any club, without notice
and even in the off season. This resembles random testing much more
closely than reasonable cause testing. The NFLPA might be reluctant to
agree to such terms, despite its general disapproval of drug use.
In fact, the NFL could be required to bargain over every aspect of the
Policy-not just testing. Such aspects include: (1) where the testing pro-
gram is administered and who administers it, (2) defining what constitutes a
positive test result, and (3) establishing appropriate discipline. In short, the
NFLPA could through reasserting its bargaining status take virtually all of
the elements of the substance abuse policy out of the sole discretion of the
league.
B. Present Absence of Constitutional Restraint
Substance abuse testing can potentially be intrusive, invasive and embar-
rassing. It can also subject employees' livelihoods to the results of tests
whose accuracy and proper administration they may not be able to control.
For those reasons, federal and state courts have frequently struck down
employers testing programs as unreasonable on constitutional grounds.
However, constitutional restrictions apply only to governmental actors-
not to private employers acting without color of law.1, Because earlier
battles between the NFLPA and NFLMC centered around traditional labor
law issues, constitutional issues were largely ignored. 6 Since players no
longer have collective bargaining protection, their inability to utilize the
strongest weapon against unwanted drug testing makes their position all the
weaker. It is useful to examine how much stronger players' claims would
be if the NFL were a state actor, as well as to explore the possibility that the
NFL might someday be required to justify its program on constitutional
grounds.
164. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (private acts are not "state action" unless a
state specifically exercises coercive power enforcing a private employer's actions). See also Skin-
ner v. Railway Labor Executive's Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) ("the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative
."). Id. at 614.
165. The NFLPA did, however, prepare a statement to Congress arguing that random testing
based on anything less than reasonable suspicion is a Fourth Amendment violation, citing several
cases involving municipalities. Of course, those cases are probably inappropriate because they
clearly involve government actors. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARconcs ABUSE AND CON-
TROL, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Sep. 10, 1987.
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1. Privacy rights
While the right to privacy, as such, does not appear in the United States
Constitution, 66 the Fourth Amendment does ensure that "the right of peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... 167 This right has
been found to extend to compulsory production by employees of blood and
urine samples.1 68 Thus, subject employers must be able to prove the reason-
ableness of the taking and handling of bodily fluids. In determining reason-
ableness, the United States Supreme Court has held that the proper analysis
"requires the balancing of the need for the particular search against the
invasion of personal rights that the search entails."' 69 Arguably, the NFL's
Policy does not meet that test.
Some courts have assessed the reasonableness of a test based on the type
of bodily fluid involved. In general, courts tend to find the taking of blood
more intrusive because it requires physical extraction.170 In contrast, urine
is a waste product which is excreted. 7 Nonetheless, it has been held that
"urine excreted for a drug test is not a waste product to be flushed down the
toilet."' 72 The NFL only expressly authorizes urine tests.
Once the blood or urine has been collected, the ensuing analysis is also
considered a Fourth Amendment search. 73 The rationale is that an em-
166. The right, however, has been extrapolated from other Constitutional guarantees. The
Supreme Court has identified a core group of "fundamental rights" which generally relate to
family relations. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy implicated when deter-
mining whether to allow a pregnancy termination); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (the
miscegenation law and the right to privacy); Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (mari-
tal contraceptive use subject to privacy right). But cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
(privacy protection does not extend to private consensual homosexual activity).
167. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment extends Fourth Amendment pro-
tections against unreasonable searches and seizures to states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
(1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 38 U.S. 25, (1949).
168. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Everitt v. Napper,
833 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1987); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
169. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
170. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). "[I]t is obvious that
this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as reasonable." Id. at 616.
171. See Mack v. U.S., F.B.I., 653 F. Supp. 70, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986):
The collection of a urine sample has little in common with stomach pumping or body
cavities' searches (or even with the taking of a blood sample, which requires the infliction
of an injury, albeit a small one). It is even less intrusive than a fingerprint which requires
that one's fingers be smeared with grease and pressed against a paper. Id. at 75.
172. Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 2 I.E.R. Cases 25, 35 (D. Neb. 1987).
173. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986).
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ployer can learn very private facts about an employee in a test, apart from
whether he is using drugs (e.g. sexually transmitted diseases, diet).174
Employees are also generally recognized to have the right to urinate in
private. Indeed, the act of urination is one of the most highly private func-
tions recognized by our society.' 75 Thus, in balancing interests, courts will
generally subordinate an employer's right to obtain an unadulterated sam-
ple with an employee's right to discretion. Nonetheless, at least one court
has noted there is no constitutional right to "modesty." '176 The NFL's pro-
gram of "frontal observation," with an examiner personally monitoring
each player in the act of urination, compromises the players interests.1 77
The recent judicial trend is also to find unreasonable drug tests which
assess off-duty use.1 78 In NTEU v. Yeutter,'79 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed a district court which upheld an employer's deci-
sion to discipline for off-premises drug use. Discipline under the NFL pol-
icy is based almost entirely on "system presence"-as few players have
ever been found to have been under the influence of drugs (with the excep-
tion of steroids) while performing.180
Ultimately, the most vulnerable practice in the Fourth Amendment
realm is random drug testing. While warrantless searches are generally
prohibited, an exception exists for certain administrative searches. But that
exception is found only to exist with respect to safety-sensitive positions or
174. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988). See also
Jevic v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of New York, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8821.
175. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (1987) explained:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of
urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function
traditionally performed without public observations; indeed, its performance in public is
generally prohibited by law as well as by social custom. Id. at 175.
176. Fowler v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Sanitation, 4 I.E.R. Cases 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
177. San Francisco 49er tight end Brent Jones explained that the process "looked like a
home-plate umpire, leaning over the catcher to see if he held onto the ball." Ian Miller, The 49ers
Encounter First Testing of Season, NFL Begins Stepping Up Steroid Monitiring, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONCILE, July 31, 1990. And there is an even more practical problem. Some players have
trouble urinating under observation. One Phoenix Cardinal player missed an hour of practice
when he could not produce a sample despite drinking 19 glasses of water. "His cup not runneth
over," explained Cardinals general manager, Larry Wilsen. Time In a Bottle, SPORTING NEWS,
Aug. 7, 1989, at 71.
178. See 6 Individual Employment Rights, BNA, No. 15, at 4 (July 30, 1991) (suggesting that
off-duty use will be the most active area of litigation within the next 18 months).
179. 5 I.E.R. Cases 1605 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
180. While testing for off-duty drug use might be more tenuous, courts have categorically
rejected the argument that an employee has the fundamental constitutional right to use illegal




positions of national security such as nuclear plant operators18 1 and air traf-
fic controllers.18 2 Courts have cooled to the notion of approving random
testing even for firefighters 8 3 and police officers.
84
The NFL would be extremely hard-pressed to justify a random program
on a constitutional basis, as the balance would probably tip in favor of
player interests." 5 Indeed, even the well established pre-season testing of
players is done regardless of suspicions, and thus might be vulnerable to
attack.
2. Due Process
Drug programs have also been challenged on general due process
grounds. Employers must comply with substantive due process by demon-
strating the inherent reasonableness and reliability of the actual test, apart
from the search or seizure itself.'86 For instance, many employers utilize
the Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT) because it is port-
able and relatively inexpensive.' 87  The EMIT has been found to have a
specificity of 90%; in other words, of 100 nonusers, the test would identify
90.88 Some courts have taken judicial notice of the reliability of such tests
and determined that reliance on them without confirmation may be arbi-
trary and capricious. 189
181. See Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District, 2 I.E.R. Cases 25 (D. Neb. 1987) (given
the highly regulated nature of the nuclear power industry, and the fact that constant surveillance
is an accepted measure of the business, employees have a diminished expectation of privacy).
182. See National Ass'n of Air Traffic Specialists v. Dole, 2 I.E.R. Cases 69, (D. Alaska 1987)
("the national interest in air safety and the public's perception of safety justifies the intrusion into
the legitimate expectation of privacy of flight service specialists. . ."). Id. at 86.
183. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, Tennessee, 845 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) (for a
mandatory drug test of firefighters is to be reasonable, there must be some evidence of a significant
department-wide drug problem or individualized suspicion).
184. See Taylor v. O'Grady, 4 I.E.R. Cases 1569 (7th Cir. 1989) (generalized interest in fos-
tering public perception of integrity of work force is not sufficient to overcome privacy interest).
185. But see Shoemaker v. Handel, 1 I.E.R. Cases 815 (3rd Cir. 1986), in which New Jersey
Racing Commission regulation was upheld which required random testing of all jockeys. The
court considered, in addition to safety factors, that the "integrity of the sport" would be compro-
mised if such testing was not allowed. The NFL would likely make a similar argument.
186. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
187. Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Wisdom of Governmental
Prohabition or Regulation of Employee Urine-analysis Testing, 11 NOVA L. Rnv. 563 (1987).
188. Rodstein, Drug Testing in the Workplace: The Challenge to Employment Relations and
Employment Law, 17 Ky. L.J. 683, 695-97 (1988); Fenton, ET AL., Comparison of Enzyme Immu-
noassay and Gas Chromotography/mass spectrometry in Forensic Toxicology, 25 GEN. FORENSIC
Sci. 314 (1980).
189. Jones v. McKenzie, 1 I.E.R. Cases, 1077, 1081 (D.C. 1986); Higgs vs. Wilson, 616 F.
Supp. 226 (W.D. Ky. 1985). But see Jenson v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35 (D. N.D. 1984); Wykoff v.
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While the NFL also conducts confirmatory tests, the level at which a
player can test positive might be unfairly low. The National Institute on
Drug Abuse has determined positive tests must contain at least 150 na-
nograms of cocaine and 15 nanograms of marijuana. 190 The NFL finds pos-
itive results for players with amounts far lower."19
Courts also examine the manner in which a search (i.e., chain of cus-
tody) is conducted in order to determine its fairness. Indeed, courts have
determined that the propriety of drug screenings depends on such factors as
the certainty of specimen identification; specimen storage, handling and
preparation; preparation and storage of testing instruments and hardware;
and qualification and training of laboratory personnel performing the test
and interpreting the results." 192 For instance, in Egloff v. New Jersey Air
National Guard,193 the plaintiff was merely given an unopened, unlabeled
bottle and told to "fill it." No provisions were apparently made to insure
nonalteration of the specimen. The court found a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation, given the fact that "the testing was marked by a conspicuous absence
of the most rudimentary non-procedural safeguards and guidelines." '94 By
this analysis, many of the drug tests conducted by the NFL (at least during
the Dr. Tenant tenure) might be challenged.
Finally, employees are recognized as having procedural due process
rights, including the right to a formal hearing. This includes the right to
confrontation as well as to adequate notice. 95 Courts have found a viola-
tion of the right when an employee was suspended without pay, pending a
hearing.' 96 While players are now allowed to appeal a decision to the Com-
missioner, one might argue that this is a hollow right since he acts as prose-
cutor, judge, and jury. 197 The NFL can and does suspend players without
Rasig, 613 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
190. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Developing an Occupational Drug Program (1978).
191. See 1990 National Football League Substance Abuse Policies, Part II, July 1990.
192. Jones v. McKenzie, I I.E.R. Cases 1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
193. 3 I.E.R. Cases 509 (D. N.J. 1988).
194. Id. at 513.
195. Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, 2 I.E.R. Cases 579 (Central Dist. Cal. 1987);
Jones v. Mckenzie, 1 I.E.R. Cases, 1076 (D.C. 1986).
196. Id.
197. Players must appeal within five days in writing to the Commissioner and while the ap-
peal is pending, discipline or other suspension will not take effect. National Football League
Policy and Procedure Re: Drug Abuse and Alcohol, July 1991, at 7. But prior to 1980 no appeal
at all was written into the policy. When Terry Taylor was suspended, his agent, Jack Mills, was
told by the NFL that there was no right to an appeal, though during his TRO hearing, the NFL
took the position that he could appeal to Commissioner Rozelle. See Richard Demak & Jerry
Kirshenbaum, The NFL Fails Its Drug Test, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 10, 1989. In fact, Judge
Demick asked "you're telling me that Pete Rozelle has the ultimate and the total authority to
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pay following a second positive drug test, even if a hearing has not taken
place.
3. Federal and State Legislation
Some mention should be made about the possible effect of drug testing
laws on the substance abuse policy. Those current and proposed laws
might temper the League's unfettered discretion in two ways. First, such
laws regulate the manner in which an employer can test. Several states
have passed such laws. 198
Second, complying with these laws might constitute state action. The
Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Assoc. 199 recently
applied a constitutional analysis to a private railroad which imposed
mandatory suspicionless post-accident testing. The Court determined that
because the employer was following federal laws by implementing a drug
program, the testing was a state action.2 "° Ultimately, the employer in
Skinner was found to have acted reasonably, but only because urination was
done without observation, testing was only employed after major accidents
and the employees were in a extremely safety-sensitive occupation.20 1
The Department of Transportation has issued guidelines which regulate
testing among interstate motor carriers, railroad and pipeline workers, and
the airline industry.20 2 Employers are to be tested prior to hire, bi-annually,
upon reasonable cause, after accidents, and randomly.2 °3 The Department
of Defense also requires private defense contractors to randomly test em-
ployees in safety-sensitive positions.2°  And, the Drug-Free Workplace
Act, while it does not mandate drug testing, does require federal contrac-
tors to maintain substance-free employment sites.205 All of these laws are
potentially dangerous for employers because they outline basic standards
but leave the implementation to the discretion of the individual employer.
suspend, and that he can lift the suspension for any reason he sees fit?" Taylor v. National Foot-
ball League, Case No. C88-11821, 18 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
198. In regard to states with NFL frachises, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-513 (1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51, (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.0455 (1990); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 21-2-140, 45-20-90); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 111 2/3, 730-5 (West 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-
4362 (1989); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44:111-1113; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.950 (1990); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 707.
199. 489 U.S. 602, (1989).
200. Id. at 615. "The fact that the Government has not compelled a search does not, by
itself, establish that a search is a private one."). Id.
201. Id
202. See e.g. 49 C.F.R. § 391.87 (1989) (interstate driver).
203. Id.
204. 48 C.F.R. § 252.223-7500(4)(i) (1988).
205. 41 U.S.C. § 702(a)(1) (1988).
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Finally, the Hatch-Boren Bill, which was introduced in Congress in
1989, has proposed mandatory random drug testing for specific industries
including professional sports franchises." 6 If the pending bill passes, the
NFL could claim the imprimatur of federal approval for such testing.
However, it also might be required to justify the reasonableness of its sub-
stance abuse policy.
V. PLAYER REMEDIES FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY THE POLICY
As discussed above, the NFLPA's renunciation of bargaining status ef-
fectively divested players of some theoretical protections afforded by tradi-
tional labor law. However, while subject to collective bargaining, the
union's remedies were limited to enforcement of the agreement and partici-
pation in the bargaining process. Most other conceivable causes of action
(including tort claims) were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act2' 7 which gives federal courts jurisdiction of claims
affecting the terms of a labor contract.2"8 "Thus, if an employee attempts to
escape application of section 301 by alleging only state law violations-
when in fact the claims implicate the CBA-the employee will be subject to
the artful pleading doctrine... 209 and the case will be removed to federal
court.
After assuming jurisdiction, federal courts will generally follow the
NLRB's policy of deferring any particular grievance to arbitration.21° The
Supreme Court has explained that if an individual were allowed to sidestep
available grievance procedures, arbitration would be hollow and the effect
would be to "eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor contract law under
section 301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility
to interpret the labor contract in the first instance. 211
Since renunciation, however, players are free, individually or collec-
tively, to challenge the substance abuse policy in the courts irrespective of
the collective bargaining agreement. But with regard to this issue (as op-
posed to an antitrust claim), players are highly unlikely to litigate as part of
a class, merely because of the abstract intrusiveness of testing or the per-
206. See S. 1903; H.R. 3940 (1989).
207. 29 U.S.C § 185 (1964).
208. See Strachan v. Union Oil Company, I I.E.R. Cases 1844 (5th Cir. 1985); Utility Work-
ers Local 246 v. Southern California Edison Company, 3 I.E.R. Cases 1068 (9th Cir. 1988);
Charles J. Morris, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 873-913 (BNA 1983).
209. Laws v. Calmat, 3 I.E.R. Cases 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1988).
210. See Edwin R. Teple, The NLRB Policy of Deferral to Arbitration, 5 UNIV. OF TOLEDO
L. REV. 563 (1977).
211. Allis-Chalmers Corporation v. Leuck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
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ceived abuse of civil rights. The reality of modem professional football is
high average salaries, short playing careers, and agents carefully guiding
players-in short, decentralized interests. Thus, only players suspended or
banned because of a positive drug test or arguably harassed through re-
pealed spot tests are likely to have an important enough personal interest to
litigate. Still, we may well see a number of suits filed in the near future
under a wide variety of possible theories. While the strength of the relative
theories vary widely, it is certain that any claim challenging the substance
abuse policy would bring it again into the national spotlight.
A. State Constitutional Claims
As discussed above, one of the strongest bases for attacking a drug test
is on federal constitutional grounds. Though courts have uniformly limited
such claims to cases of governmental action, employees have recently begun
to assert claims based on privacy rights afforded by state constitutions
which contain different language and different legislative histories. Califor-
nia, a traditionally progressive legal state, has broken ground in this area
and may influence courts in other jurisdictions.
The California Constitution provides "all people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are life, liberty and
... privacy ....212 In contrast, the United States Constitution does not
specifically enumerate the right to privacy. Thus, California has expressly
made the right fundamental and on par with other rights such as the posses-
sion of property.
With this backdrop, the court in Taylor v. O'Grady ,13 considered the
efficacy of an employer's refusal to hire a job applicant who would not sub-
mit to drug testing. The court held that urinalysis testing implicates the
right to privacy.2" 4 It also held because the state constitution does not spe-
cifically state whether its provisions are limited to state actors, it must also
apply to private employers.215 Ultimately, the court conducted the tradi-
tional balancing test and determined because the plaintiff was not a current
employee, she had a lesser expectation of privacy. Thus, the court upheld
the employer's testing program.2" 6
212. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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But in Luck v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co.,217 a California court consid-
ered the effect of suspicionless drug testing on a current employee. The
plaintiff was a six year employee who the company had no reason to believe
was impaired on the job. The court found that on balance the interest of
the employee was more compelling and the employer had violated her right
to privacy. Accordingly, it upheld a jury award of economic damages.218
To date, only one other state has imposed constitutional requirements
on private employers.219 Indeed, some plaintiffs have tried and failed to
persuade other courts that such an extension is warranted.220 Nonetheless,
at least for the NFL's four California teams, the Wilkinson and Luck deci-




1. Invasion of Privacy
Even if no federal or state constitutional privacy claims are available,
players may still proceed with similar common law causes of action. In
order to maintain such claims, plaintiffs must show an intentional and un-
reasonable intrusion. The tort includes the following four categories: an
intrusion upon seclusion, publicity given to private life, appropriation of
likeness and placing a person in a false light.222 An aggrieved player would
likely proceed under the first category.
Plaintiffs have attempted to argue that off-duty illegal drug use is, by
right, a private matter until it can be affirmatively shown that such use
interferes with work performance. According to this theory, an employer
would violate the right to privacy if he or she attempted to discover any off-
duty private facts. But courts have noted the right to be free from intru-
sions is not absolute.221 Indeed, the "right does not extend so far as to
subvert those rights which spring from social conditions including business
217. 5 I.E.R. Cases 421 (Cal. App. 1990).
218. Id.
219. The Montana Constitution, likewise, provides a right to privacy extending to private
employers. See State v. Helfrich, 600 P.2d 816 (Mon. 1979).
220. See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaskan Drilling, Inc., 4 I.E.R. Cases 129 (Ala. 1989).
221. Six other states with NFL teams have constitutions which explicitly recognize privacy
rights-though more have expressly applied their terms to private employers. See ARIZ. CONST.
art. II, § 8; FLA. art. I, § 3; ILL. CONsT. art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; WAsH. CONST. art. I,
§ 7; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1 (1989).
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652(b), 652(d), 652(c), 652(e), respectively. See
also Decker, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE (1987).
223. See Henry H. Perritt, WORKPLACE TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILrrIEs, 207-213 (1991).
[Vol. 2:1
NFL SUBSTANCE ABUSE
relations. '224 Therefore, legitimate business reasons for testing are likely to
make the testing or intrusion reasonable.
It is important to note that players may proceed not just against their
team or the League but against the testing laboratory. In Neal v. Corning
Glass Works Corp. ,225 an employee sued an emergency room physician for
invasion of privacy when he shared treatment information with the employ-
ees regular physician regarding drug use at work. The court refused to
dismiss the case on summary judgment grounds, finding a colorable claim
existed.226
Ultimately, drug testing is likely to be upheld so long as the procedure
for testing is not outrageous. In general, employees are afforded less consid-
eration in balancing rights in regard to a tort claim than in regard to a
constitutional claim.
2. Defamation
A more powerful claim for a pro football player would probably be for
defamation. In fact, defamation is the most frequently alleged claim in law-
suits involving drug-testing.227 In order to establish liability, a plaintiff
must show: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b)
an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting to at least
negligence in the part of the publisher; and (d) absence of special harm.228
The leading case in the employee drug testing context is Houston Belt &
Terminal Railway Co. v. Wherry,229 in which an employer tested a worker
who fainted on the job. The employer found traces of what it thought was
methadone in the employee's urine, though the employee's personal physi-
cian explained the substance was not methadone. The employee was termi-
nated, but not for drug use. When he later sought assistance from the
Veteran's Administration, the Department of Labor contacted the em-
ployer, who said that the individual had been discharged for misconduct
associated with drug use.23 The court upheld a compensatory award of
$150,000 and $50,000 in punitive damages.231
The element of publication would probably be satisfied in any player
claim, given the tendency of the League to articulate its reasons for disci-
224. DiTomaso v. Electronic Data Systems, 3 I.E.R. Cases 1700, 1703 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
225. 5 I.E.R. Cases 1636, 1637 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
226. Id. at 1637.
227. See Robert DeCresce & Mark Lifshitz, DRUG TESTING IN THE WORKPLACE 28 (1989).
228. See Perritt, supra note 223, at 251-255.
229. 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
230. Id. at 746-748.
231. Id. at 753-755.
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pline. A Sports Illustrated article also maintains that under Dr. Tenant, the
NFL regularly violated even its own standard of confidentiality.232 More-
over, even if the League did not disclose, it could be subject to the docu-
ment of compelled self-publication. The doctrine applies when an employer
issues a communication to an employee, knowing that the employee will
need to publish it in order to get another job.233 In an example, a player
banned from the league might effectively be forced to protect his reputation
by announcing to the media that "the League said I flunked a drug test, but
I know they are wrong."
Finally, the League might not always be able to use truth as a defense.
In the past, perhaps fearing its testing procedures could be impeached, the
NFL has backed off discipline after announcing the player had tested posi-
tive-essentially destroying for itself an affirmative defense.234 Given the
damage that the disclosure of a false positive test could inflict, the League
or any team could face a major liability.
3. Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In order to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff
must establish that a defendant's conduct was "extreme and outrageous"
and damages flowed proximately from such conduct.23 If a plaintiff cannot
establish intent, he may proceed under a negligence theory if the requisite
elements of duty, breach, foreseeability and damages can be identified.236
But courts tend to subject plaintiffs to a rather heavy burden.
In Blankenship v. South Carolina Electric & Gas. Co.,237 an employer
unilaterally modified its employee handbook to provide for random drug
testing. When the employee refused to submit to testing, she was dis-
charged, required to surrender her badge, and was escorted from the work-
place. The court dismissed her claim for emotional distress while
232. See Richard Demak & Jerry Kirschenbaum, NFL Fails its Drug Test, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED, July 10, 1989.
233. See Churchey v. Adolph Coors Company, 759 P.2d 1336 (Colo. 1988) (defendant liable
when he should have foreseen that plaintiff would be under a "strong compulsion" to disclose
defamatory statements. But cf Quinn v. Limited Express, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Pa.
1989).
234. The NFL had decided to discipline Chicago Bears defensive end Richard Dent in 1988
when he refused to take a drug test after having tested positive in the past for cocaine use. When
the NFL suspended him, he threatened to sue and the league agreed to dismiss the discipline. Jeff
Hardie, Dent Helped Straighen Out Bears, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1990).
235. See e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (magazine depicted plaintiff's
mother in sexually degrading manner).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 46, 47.
237. 5 I.E.R. Cases 930 (S.C. 1990).
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acknowledging "if she did not want to work under the new drug guidelines,
her only recourse was to quit. ' 238 The court also noted that "most plaintiffs
in civil actions think that a defendant's conduct is outrageous, yet few fac-
tual situations are outrageous as a matter of law... [the] mere discharge
from employment is [not] outrageous. 239
However, when the method of testing itself is more personally offensive
in nature, plaintiffs have recovered. In Kelley v. Schlumberger Technology
Corp., 24 an employer's drug test revealed that an employee used marijuana.
Plaintiff argued negligent infliction of emotional distress based in large part
on the fact that the test included "direct observation", causing him disgust
at the "idea of someone being paid to look at [his] penis while [he] uri-
nated." The court upheld a jury award of $125,000 in compensatory dam-
ages.241 Given the NFL's policy of "frontal observation", the League might
be similarly vulnerable.
C. Wrongful Discharge
A plaintiff may sue for the wrongfulness of his discharge, rather than
any injuries suffered as a result. In this cause of action, an individual also
need not show impropriety or outrageousness associated with the proce-
dures of testing. A preliminary, but not inconsiderable, aspect of this claim
is proving drug use was not a proper basis for dismissal. In the absence of a
collective bargaining agreement or a special statute, courts generally con-
sider workers to be at-will employees who can be terminated without cause.
1. Public Policy
In order to state a public policy claim, a plaintiff must show the exist-
ence of a clear public policy (generally evidenced by statute) that would be
jeopardized if a defendant were allowed to escape liability for terminating
him in the absence of an overriding justification on the part of the em-
ployer.242 Plaintiffs are often unable to articulate a clear public policy and
resort to alleging privacy rights loosely and extrapolated from many stat-
utes.243 In such circumstances, courts will often state that they are "reluc-
238. Id at 933.
239. Id
240. 3 I.E.R. Cases 696 (1st. Cir. 1988).
241. Id at 697.
242. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870.
243. See Greco v. Halliburton Company, 2 I.E.R. Cases 1281 (D. Wyo. 1987); Hershberger v.
Jersey Shore Steel Company, 5 I.E.R. Cases 710 (Pa. Super. 1990).
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tant to find that efforts to assure a drug-free workplace contravene the
public policy of the state..." 24
An employee is on much stronger footing when his state has a private
drug testing law which is violated by the employer and which is used as the
basis for the termination. In Henessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co.,245
although a New Jersey law required that all drug testing be done on a rea-
sonable suspicion basis, plaintiff was terminated for refusing to take a ran-
dom test. The court found the discharge improper based on the public
policy pronounced, especially since the employer could articulate no rea-
sonable basis for its actions.2" If the league institutes random testing, play-
ers in states with drug testing laws may be able to use the decision as
precedent.
2. Breach of Contract
All players are bound by a standard contract. 247 That contract does
not include any mention of drug testing or discipline, except to state that
individual clubs may impose appropriate discipline.248 The substance abuse
policy, however, might be considered an employee handbook, since it artic-
ulates separate work rules. Courts in most states have recognized that,
under appropriate circumstances, an employee handbook can act as a con-
tract, abrogating the general at-will nature of employment.249
Johnson v. Carpenter Technology,2 0 is illustrative. In Johnson, an em-
ployee was terminated after he refused to submit to a drug and alcohol
urinalysis screening. The employee claimed he was orally promised that he
would have permanent employment. He also alleged that because the em-
ployer unilaterally changed the employee handbook to include drug test-
ing, he only needed to follow the old handbook-which did not provide for
drug testing. The court noted that since the employee was not subject to a
collective bargaining agreement, his continued employment amounted to an
acquiescence to the terms of the new contract.51 Therefore, at best, a
player would be relegated to arguing that the NFL was not following its
244. See Monroe v. Consolidated Freightway, 3 I.E.R. Cases, 1185, 1187 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
245. 1989 N.J. Super. Luxis 474.
246. Id.
247. See National Football League Standard Player Contract.
248. Id. at 3.
249. See e.g., Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154, 368 N.W.2d 666 (1985); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 590, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Duldulao v. St.
Mary of Nazareth Hosp., 15 Il. 2d 482,505 N.E.2d 314 (1987); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111
Cal. App. 3rd 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).




current policy. The contract argument would probably have no effect on a
challenge to a new procedure, such as random testing, so long as notice was
given in an updated policy.
D. Discrimination
Finally, a player might challenge the administration or discipline of the
substance abuse policy based on a discrimination theory. Nearly every state
in the country has a fair employment law which prohibits employment deci-
sions whose purpose (disparate treatment) or effect (disparate impact) is to
treat differently employees who are part of a protected class.2" 2 Moreover,
various federal laws provide similar protections. In general, an employee's
statutory remedies are limited to backpay. While such a claim would prob-
ably fail, it might inflict a great deal of damage on the league from a public
relations standpoint.
1. Based on Status as Addict
Many states treat drug and alcohol addiction as a handicap which an
employer must reasonably accommodate if an employee is qualified to do a
job.253 Of course, inability to do a job because of the particular addiction is
good cause for discharge.254 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides simi-
lar federal protection, but it only applies to federal contractors.2 5
A statute of particular interest in this area is the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act ("ADA") which will apply to many employers, including pro-
fessional sports franchises, by July 26, 1992.256 The ADA protects from
discrimination "qualified individuals with a disability."'2 57 Individuals are
considered disabled if: (a) they have a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of their major life activities; (b) they have a
record of such impairment and; (c) they are regarded as having such an
impairment.258 However, current illegal users of drugs are not protected
252. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 111.31-111.395.
253. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 111.34; Jane M. Nold, Note, Hidden Handicaps: Protection of
Alcoholics, Drug Addicts, and the Mentally Ill Against Employment Discrimination Under the
Rehibilitation Act of 1973 and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 725. It is
beyond the scope of this article to exhaustively discuss the doctrine of reasonable accommodation.
254. Squires v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, 97 Wis. 2d 648, 294 N.W.2d 48 (Ct.
App. 1980).
255. 29 U.S.C. § 701-796 (1982).
256. Pub. L No. 101-336. By that date, all employers with more than 15 individuals will be
subject to its terms.
257. Id. at § 102(a).
258. Id. at § 3.
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under the ADA.2 9 The ADA neither authorizes nor prohibits drug test-
ing, though it requires proper procedural protections. 2°
Thus, a player might argue that it is discriminatory to test without sus-
picion of current use (i.e. pre-season). Moreover, a player who has tested
positive in the past may not be currently using, but is still subject to reason-
able cause testing which is essentially done at random. While one might
argue this is discrimination based on past use, the ADA does not prohibit
employers from testing to ensure rehabilitation. In addition, the legislative
history of the ADA indicates Congress specifically approved of the NFL
substance abuse policy stating,
The committee believes that the leagues' policies are in compli-
ance with the requirements of this act. The National Football
League permits its players who test positive on drug tests to enter a
treatment program and not be disciplined on the first occasion.
Players who test positive on a second occasion are permitted to re-
ceive treatment but are suspended for a 30-day period or until
deemed fit to return. After a third positive drug test a player is
banned from play and is ineligible for restatement for at least one
year. This policy is consistent with the act.26'
In general, discrimination is not found where an offending employee is
offered rehabilitation following the first offense.262 Still, a suspended or
banned player might attempt to argue he was not afforded a "reasonable
opportunity" for rehabilitation, pointing perhaps to statements from Dr.
Tenant dismissing the viability of the rehabilitation process. Thus, if the
NFL truly wishes to insulate itself from liability for discrimination, it will
put greater emphasis on rehabilitation rather than punishment.
2. Based on Race
Enough circumstantial evidence may also exist for a minority player to
posit a charge of race discrimination in regard to the administration of the
policy. As discussed above, the Baskin Report revealed alleged evidence of
coverups of positive drug tests from white quarterbacks. If true, this would
be evidence of disparate treatment, prohibited by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.263 In any event, it is unlikely the NFL would like to
259. Id. at § 104(a).
260. Id. at § 104(d). In fact, according to the ADA drug testing is not considered to be a
medical examination.
261. Public L. No. 101-335. 1990 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (101 Stat.) 363.
262. Indeed, some states such as Minnesota actually require an opportunity for rehabilitation
before an employee may be terminated. MINN. STAT. § 181.952.
263. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
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open up all of its documentation on the program in the course of litigation
discovery. While no claim has yet been filed on this basis, the mere threat
could cause the League to settle with (and perhaps reinstate) a banned
player.
Even if direct discrimination could not be proven, as a last resort a
player could make out a prima facie disparate impact claim under Title VIM
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,2 a plaintiff challenged an
employer policy that tested for methadone use on the basis that 62 to 65%
of the methadone users in New York were black or Hispanic. The United
States Supreme Court, however, found no discrimination because the rule
was job related and not motivated by race.26 A player bringing such a
claim would have to show that blacks (or black athletes in particular) are
more prone to drug use-a very difficult standard.
Any of the above-described causes of action are theoretically viable.
However, what might dissuade a player from bringing such a claim is the
fact he would almost certainly make himself a symbol of substance abuse-
not an enviable place in the history of the game.
VI. CONCLUSION
The development of the NFL's drug policy has been slow and unsteady,
marked not by cooperation but by conflict. Although everyone seems to
agree some type of drug testing program should be implemented, the dis-
trustful relationship between the NFLPA and the NFL has made the imple-
mentation of an effective substance abuse policy in the NFL virtually
impossible. Since the NFLPA renounced its bargaining status, the NFL
probably has the ability to force random testing upon its players, thereby
further chilling the relationship between management and employees.
However, such a move might expose the NFL to a plethora of individual
lawsuits regarding privacy rights, employment rights, and the accuracy of
the NFL's drug testing program. Given the scandal that surrounded the
Dr. Tenant regime, the NFL substance abuse policy needs no more negative
attention. Moreover, the NFL is already waging war against its players in
several pending antitrust lawsuits; just as Commissioners Rozelle and Tag-
liabue have been concerned about the impact substance abuse has on the
"integrity of the game", so too must the NFL be concerned with the nega-
tive impact further adverse legal decisions might have on the League.
264. 440 U.S. 568, (1979).
265. Id. See also Drayton v. City of St. Petersburg, 477 F. Supp. 846 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
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Players have become more aggressive in defending their rights. No
longer do players consider it a privilege merely to play in the National
Football League. Today's star players become multi-million dollar busi-
nesses through increasing salaries, endorsements and investments. They
cannot afford to allow the NFL to have sole discretion in an area that could
conceivably destroy their livelihoods.
At the same time, the possibility does exist for a mutually acceptable
resolution of this issue. Commissioner Tagliabue has suggested in this re-
gard "[T]here's probably a lot we can do, if we had a union which was
willing to sit down and negotiate at the collective bargaining table ... we
could work out a system that was satisfactory on many of these scores. " 266
It is clear is that the cooperative approach has enabled the NBA to adopt
the strongest drug policy in professional sports, and to achieve success that
was not envisioned just ten years ago. Whether the NFL can achieve simi-
lar success remains to be seen.
266. Ken Denlinger, Tagliabue Is Quick to Tackle Some Tough Questions, THE WASH. POST,
Jan. 28, 1990, at 28.
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